PART I

Economic Development

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CHAPTER 1

Emergency Food Security Recovery

An Afghanistan Case

ADAM KOONS

Project Background

When this project was first conceived in 2008, rural Afghanistan had been experiencing severe food insecurity following years of drought. For three years, the staple crop, wheat, had mostly or totally failed in much of the country. Farm households had depleted their seed stores in failed crops, and in extreme cases farm families consumed their seed. The resulting production scarcity and food insecurity had several consequences, including a dramatic increase in (primarily illegally) imported food from Pakistan. Although a viable agricultural season was being predicted, households no longer had seed stocks and other inputs on hand, and they could not afford new seed, fertilizer, and other items. The local credit-based network of private agricultural suppliers was unable to provide additional support to household farms.

There was also real concern over an alternative and lucrative strategy for farmers: growing poppies for the illegal drug industry, which in turn supplied substantial resources to insurgent forces in Afghanistan. Although risky and dangerous, numerous farmers adopted this tempting option.

In parallel with the US government's military and political stabilization efforts in the country, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) had many large-scale economic development, infrastructural, and humanitarian programs underway, as did the British government and many other donor countries and international agencies.

USAID had several concerns over the increasingly widespread food insecurity. Providing emergency food aid was extremely complicated logistically, enormously expensive, only a short-term option, and unsustainable, and it did

nothing to assist in restarting local agricultural self-sufficiency. In addition, neither the Afghan nor US governments wanted farmers to resort to poppy production.

USAID sought therefore to restore local livelihood capacities in an effort not only to enable small farmers to produce sustenance but to actually revitalize Afghanistan's wheat production sector to make it appealing to farmers and support the economy. To achieve this, farmers would need seeds and other inputs such as fertilizer on a massive scale. But there were many financial, logistical, operational, political, cultural, and agricultural complexities.

At the time, I was the global humanitarian director for a US-based international nongovernmental organization (NGO) that already had large-scale, USAID-funded infrastructure programs in Afghanistan. In Kabul, I lunched with a USAID officer with whom I had worked on several successful programs, mostly in Africa. He was serving there as a short-term food security advisor and was looking for ideas to address wheat cultivation.

Admittedly, I did not know Afghanistan or its culture(s) very well then, and I had never worked or researched there. Nonetheless, I pitched an idea based on a strategy I had successfully implemented in Lebanon after the Hezbollah hostilities with Israel in 2006, a very different country and context. The officer was intrigued and asked to see a "concept paper," a two- to five-page summary laying out basic strategies, goals, objectives, and an implementation plan. This would give USAID an idea of whether they would be interested; if so, they would invite us to prepare a full, detailed, and precise technical and budget proposal for possible funding.

My colleagues and I immediately set about preparing the paper. We met with senior members of our NGO's Afghan team, some Afghan field staff, and members of my headquarters humanitarian team to work out elements of the prospective project. We provided the concept paper to USAID in a matter of days. Shortly thereafter, instead of asking for a full proposal, they unexpectedly requested a more detailed and expanded concept paper, along with a reasonably detailed budget. So, instead of a fifty-page proposal, we had to focus in on a fifteen-page paper.

However, in order for us to really know if our ideas were operationally, culturally, socioeconomically, and financially valid, viable, feasible, and appropriate, we needed to quickly conduct careful analyses on a number of topics. We achieved this by calling on numerous local experts. Afghanistan is a very complicated and expensive place in which to operate, particularly in isolated rural areas, and local knowledge was key in understanding what was realistic and achievable.

When we submitted our expanded paper, we were nervous about our estimated $30 million budget, a figure that seemed very large. We received back a totally unexpected and entirely unprecedented response from USAID. They, along with the British government's aid agency at the time, the Department for

International Development (DFID),[1] would fund the project. However, they were so optimistic about our strategy and approach that they asked us to expand the coverage to accommodate a $60 million budget. Although no one in our organization had previously experienced such a request, we excitedly but cautiously agreed. Our participant target would now be 250,000 farms instead of the original 176,000. As far as we could tell, this would now be the largest project of its kind in USAID history and quite an overwhelming undertaking. (We must have done something right because USAID subsequently requested that the project be expanded in a follow-on phase.)

Project Description

Our plan laid out a project goal of providing accessible and affordable agricultural inputs to drought-affected subsistence farmers to promote wheat and other staple production during the fall/winter 2008 and spring 2009 seasons. The two specific objectives were to (1) increase the access to seeds and fertilizer by 250,000 (household) farms to improve wheat yields and food availability in those seasons and (2) to provide vulnerable farmers access to income-generation opportunities.

Our strategy was very innovative and virtually unique at the time. Generally, similar projects designed and implemented by international organizations used a simple, decades-old approach. Ideally, though not always, from an initial field assessment, the organization would decide what supplies and materials were needed for each farm, and how much. The project would then purchase the supplies from a large-scale wholesaler and deliver them directly to villages for farmers to collect. We did not think this strategy was locally appropriate or viable because it would likely create resentment on different fronts, as it did not take any local human, agronomic, or economic considerations into account.

Instead, based on our initial ideas pitched to USAID and subsequent field validation assessments, the farming supplies would be provided through a flexible voucher system. This was based on several realities: (1) although small, the farms were different sizes; (2) some farmers had seeds, and some did not; (3) farmers may not want to grow only a particular crop or crop mix, or a particular amount of certain crops; (4) some farmers may have sold some of their tools; and (5) farmers knew their own needs best, therefore a one-size-fits-all package was not appropriate. Also, men and women typically grow different crops, and there were many woman-headed households. Flexible vouchers sought to address all of these issues.

Selected communities would be informed of the intended project and the voucher approach carefully explained to community leaders and members, both men and women. They could then apply for vouchers, and project staff would

work closely with and through preexisting local Community Development Councils to review the applications. Eligible farmers would receive vouchers worth approximately US$145. Recipients could use the vouchers up to their monetary equivalent on any agricultural inputs they felt necessary to restart their wheat cultivation and support household food security. The project arranged for vouchers to be redeemed at the agricultural supply depots where farmers typically got their supplies.

The volume of depot-supplied goods was unprecedented, since in normal times most farmers used their own seed. The project had to ensure that the depots would be adequately supplied with seeds, fertilizer, and other needed inputs. To address this, the project worked directly with large-scale wholesalers that typically supplied the depots to ensure they had the financial and logistical capacity to support an effective supply chain. Additionally, to promote successful germination, seeds purchased by the wholesalers for the depots were required to be certified and tested.

Also, and very importantly, to enhance each voucher recipient's involvement and "ownership," a 15 percent copayment (equal to about twenty dollars) was required from the farmers upon their voucher redemption. The amount was calculated to be within the means of the recipients and was part of the original voucher application criteria that farmers agreed to, with support from the Community Development Councils. These copayments could be reinvested back into the communities for various agriculture activities, thereby further extending the impact of the program.

To further maximize production, agricultural training would be offered at each depot. There was no requirement to accept training, but it was available at any time during the cultivation season. It was promoted as an on-demand way for farmers to learn new techniques for potentially increasing their yields of wheat and other crops such as vegetables, but it did not force the training or promote a fixed curriculum that might not respond to farmer interests. The trainers were government agricultural officers who had been largely inactive because of lack of resources and demand. Their salaries would be partially supported by the project.

As the project was getting underway, the US government held such high hopes for its efficacy and importance that it was specifically singled out and recognized by US special envoy Richard Holbrooke as a key point in nonmilitary assistance to Afghanistan.

Project Design and the Anthropologist's Role and Impact

The project team knew that this novel approach required "buy-in" from a variety of stakeholders at all levels. We were facing the challenge, particularly at

the local level, that it was not the "normal" way things worked and that the approach was brought in externally by foreign aid workers. Still, we did not want the effort to appear distasteful or strange.

An important element of my contributions as anthropologist was insisting on, and designing, a very rapid ethnographic research activity to assess the model viability. Our specialized assessment was tailored for the proposed strategy by using an integrated, community-level approach that sought to examine not only the intended, direct beneficiaries but also, in a holistic manner, the relationships and potential consequences of interactions between the different stakeholders. We wanted to measure the potential acceptance but also identify or predict any possible, secondary, or negative consequences. In doing so, we also examined the potential roles of male and female community members, local businesses and the private sector, local traditional leaders, local project staff, local government officials, the national government, ourselves, and the US government. All of this data collection had to be done at lightning speed, somewhat in contradiction to the "normal" duration and depth of ethnographic or applied research. The analysis, also by necessity, had to be largely qualitative and performed in a "quick and dirty" manner. The research used a mixture of local professional expertise, existing sociocultural literature, random but limited field interviews, focus groups, and key informants (including our own local staff). We were able to quickly pilot a small field sample of test questions before implementing the actual research. Because of our own field staff limits in coverage, time, effort, specialized training, logistics, and ongoing insecurity, we contracted with an Afghan-owned social science research organization and worked with them in close consultation and supervision to undertake the actual field research. The analysis was then conducted jointly.

Key learnings included the following: (1) there were no agricultural resources remaining for the coming season; (2) local farmers knew there were alternate, albeit illegal, crops they could cultivate; (3) the selected remote regions were unaccustomed to aid and suspicious of and uncomfortable with dealing with nonlocal persons; (4) the high level of local dignity and pride indicated that farmers would be offended by charity, even agricultural inputs; (5) perceptions existed among the population that the Afghan government takes from its citizens and does not give back; (6) there are strongly established and time-honored relations between local producers and local agricultural supply depots, and these include providing inputs credit and access to harvest sales. These findings, along with many others, supported our belief that the project model was feasible.

However, there were also considerable challenges in undertaking such a large and complicated project in a country as difficult as Afghanistan, particularly under such insecure and politically sensitive conditions and in remote, rural locations. We were also working within an almost impossibly short time

frame. Most large projects, even urgent food-security-oriented efforts, take many months to launch and get underway, and these often take years to show measurable results. Once started, we had to show tangible results during the very next growing season. This challenge was particularly stressful when the funder doubled our starting budget and therefore the magnitude of coverage and objective targets. For a few moments, we considered if we could or should ethically and operationally accept the doubled budget on an as-yet untested project. Ultimately we decided that, as the framework had already been designed, scaling up was possible.

Connected to our time constraint was the process of orienting our partners, stakeholders at every level, and the communities to this new and very different approach. We had to gain their trust and get their concurrence and collaboration while also establishing and maintaining a level of operational transparency that was not the norm. This was particularly true for the transparency we insisted on locally regarding developing, communicating, implementing, and monitoring the criteria and process used in selecting the voucher recipients. This transparency was very important to help mitigate jealousy among those who did not receive vouchers and to avoid the implications or accusations of bias.

A particularly thorny challenge was our insistence (and the donors' requirement) to fully include women. In Afghan society, women's roles are very strictly prescribed, and their access to goods, along with their capacity to make decisions, is severely limited. We sought to address this by ensuring the availability of inputs (vegetable seeds, garden implements) that are generally only used by women and by providing training specifically designed for women, their horticultural activities, and increased family food security. In many cases, we organized women's peer-to-peer training. We also spent considerable time with elders and Community Development Councils to ensure they understood the vital importance of women's roles in food security and thus the importance of women's access to portions of the vouchers. We also stressed the importance of recognizing the high number of woman-headed households that might not otherwise receive vouchers. As needed, our staff assisted women who were household heads to ensure they could complete the applications.

An additional concern and challenge that often weighed heavily was that we were undertaking long-term humanitarian activities in a conflict-ridden country and politically contentious environment in which there were multiple, simultaneous interests, objectives, and motivations. We were very much aware that humanitarian principles are sometimes at odds with political ends and that there were any number of potential military and security issues and consequences to activities. These were factors we could not change or even mitigate, and so we had to focus on the humanitarian goals we intended to address.

Because of the position and authority I held at my NGO, I had the rare opportunity to be involved in almost every aspect of the project, including conception of the initial idea, promoting and testing the idea in discussions with the potential financial supporter, designing the strategy and approach for the project, fine-tuning the strategy details, organizing the research to field test the ideas from a social, cultural, economic and logistical perspective, leading the process of developing a budget, and coauthoring the actual funding request document. It is unusual to have that amount of input, even with a typical NGO project, since many jobs and program phases are somewhat compartmentalized.

I was fortunate to have the opportunity to design my role in the NGO in this way. I was involved only indirectly in the actual project management and in its monitoring and evaluation. The responsibilities of the team I led included all aspects of developing and launching programs, but not the ongoing operational management or the evaluation—these would have presented a conflict of interest. Although my level of input may have been unusual in general for an anthropologist in this particular arena, it was not uncommon for me in this organization to have a similar role in numerous other humanitarian and disaster responses.

In this case, I did what applied anthropologists are very good at, as are many other seasoned aid workers across a range of disciplines: innovatively connecting the dots to address new challenges. As noted above, a few years earlier I had helped design what turned out to be a very successful flexible voucher-based humanitarian program in Lebanon. Although Afghanistan was a very different setting, the concept I applied was the same.

Still, it is important to make a clear distinction between a "typical" voucher program, used increasingly in relief and development, and our model for a flexible voucher, since many project elements rest on this distinction. Normal vouchers would enable recipients to redeem a predetermined and fixed amount from a predetermined list of goods—that is, one size fits all: wheat seeds and fertilizer in a set quantity, regardless of what quantities or other supplies were needed. Our design facilitated farmers in choosing, as they best determined, any supplies in any quantities up to a maximum monetary value.

The project was therefore designed with a grounding in economic anthropology, exploring knowledge of local exchange and livelihood systems as cultural traits. In anthropological terms, cultural relativism was used to assess how project components might fit into a beneficiary worldview of individuals, of family members and providers/decision-makers, and of community members. For example, we considered the differences in effect on locally perceived self-esteem and respect if goods were provided entirely free as charity rather than if they were distributed through vouchers.

Additionally, to ensure the effective articulation of the roles of various stakeholders at different levels, from the community leaders to the government officials and donors (USAID and DFID), each set of responsibilities and commitments was designed after careful examination of differential self-interest and motivating factors, and in consultation with these stakeholders.

Implementation and Outcomes

Because of our organization's structure, my team was involved with the elements described above, but a different group took over project implementation and management. This implementation group comprised a headquarters-based project supervisor and a country-based project director (sometimes called "chief of party" in US government jargon) who reported to the country director in Afghanistan and the headquarters manager. The project director was responsible for the recruitment of in-country staff, management of the budget, and local government relations and was also accountable for the efficient implementation, ongoing management, and ultimate results of the project. The design team and I had no further official role. We did spend time and effort trying to ensure that the project implementation group understood our design rationale, intent, and ideas for effective implementation, and we kept the door open for follow-up consultations.

Although we had to move on to other assessments and project designs in a busy office, we sometimes sought informal updates and progress reports from colleagues during the Afghan project implementation; we also had access to formal monitoring and reporting documents.

At the end of the original one-year project, evaluation data from internal monitoring, six separate internal and external studies and surveys, and other sources showed that the distribution of vouchers directly to farmers was a primary reason for the program's success in reaching target beneficiaries. Among other outcomes, the project:

- provided 297,000 vouchers (at a 99.9 percent redemption rate), aiding 1.7 million family members;
- reached 3,000 women-headed household farms, benefitting 18,000 family members;
- reached 341,301 farmers with agricultural training;
- supported 175 local agricultural depots with additional business;
- increased wheat yields in planted areas by 55 percent for irrigated farms and 94 percent for rain-fed farms (as compared with nonrecipients);
- showed that the percentage of farmers selling wheat at local and regional markets increased from 14 percent in 2008 to 59 percent in 2009.

Overall, household food security was reestablished, while self-esteem and self-determination for farmers were maintained by avoiding a charity-oriented donation system. This particularly resulted from the open-ended vouchers and the farmers' copayments.

In a country where a frequent alternative crop to wheat is opium poppies, there was constant concern by the US and Afghan governments that as wheat became more difficult to grow, farmers would turn to poppies as their only option for an accessible livelihood. This program was able to reestablish wheat as a viable and productive crop for household support. According to USAID, in the season following project implementation, wheat harvests were both impressive and sufficient for recovery-level production, a result partially due to the project.

Existing local social, agricultural, and economic systems, protocols, and processes were respected and left intact, such as working through local leadership structures and maintaining close existing and symbiotic relations between producers and depots. This was done without the perception of external imposition, interference, or prescription by working consultatively through the local social and political mechanisms.

The deliberate use of local agricultural depots had several intended positive effects. First, bypassing the local depots by providing the goods directly from a central supplier would have undercut local commerce and created bad feelings and lack of support for the project among local businesses. Also, farmers had long-standing relationships with the depots for supplies, and sometimes they utilized the depots as links to buyers at harvest time. Additionally, the project added considerable new farmer business, which could serve to expand relationships and create enhanced local market system linkages. It could even later lead to potential access to credit or other mutual arrangements.

A critical and rather smart element introduced by the donors (which we appreciated and very much endorsed) was the farmer copayment. This approach is very rarely used in humanitarian programs (or development programs), as beneficiaries are usually considered too poor to participate. However, the cash investment from the farmers turned out to be a further opportunity to instill the sense of program ownership. Since they were personally invested in the supplies, the vouchers were not regarded as charity; rather, the farmers felt like they were in partnership with the donors. We felt that this aspect was a very important factor in enhancing the normalcy of self-determination and the feeling of personal responsibility. Operationally, the project plan was that all of the collected copayments would be pooled at the local level, managed jointly by the project, the Community Development Councils, and the local government, and allocated for reinvestment activities by the communities, who would participate in selecting how the funds would be used, thus serving as a further affirmation of local control.

We noted a somewhat unplanned but very welcome and impressive collaborative multiplier effect. Agricultural depots often carried larger and more expensive farm equipment, such as small motorized two-wheel tractors, which were usually far too expensive for individual farmers. However, we found that in a number of cases a group of farmers would pool their vouchers to purchase a tractor to share. In the same way, other shared tools were purchased jointly to defray costs.

For all of the reasons described, this program's effectiveness led to it becoming a model within Afghanistan as well as for the organization I worked for in our other country programs. The flexible voucher model was replicated in a major expansion (see epilogue below), and other donors have shown significant interest in this approach. The model generated lessons learned about program design and implementation that were used in general program design strategies for both our NGO and USAID.

One disappointment we had, which is almost universally common among humanitarian programs, is that no in-depth ethnographic or sociocultural research was conducted in the post-project period to examine or truly validate longer-term and deeper project efficacy, sustainability, and sociocultural impacts.

The Anthropological Difference

It may be difficult to distinguish the anthropology here from good, sound, appropriate economic development, and humanitarian practice. Much of the anthropological influence is rather subtle. Gratifyingly, anthropological perspectives, data collections approaches, and vocabulary, such as qualitative and participatory assessment, holism, cultural relativism (i.e., cultural sensitivity), and integrated and interrelated community systems, have suffused the thinking in this and other good project design in diverse cultural and economic settings. Though it will never be as rigorous or as in depth as formal ethnography, what was once described as "development anthropology" is now just good development design. Recognizing the differential roles of women and men and how they affect projects, understanding different economic, social, and political statuses and power relations, or ensuring that projects do no harm are ideas grounded in anthropologists' in-depth knowledge but are now common considerations among aid workers. The fact that I, as the design team anthropologist, ensured that such principles and approaches were appropriately used could be considered "action anthropology" (e.g., Tax 1975), or just responsible project design.

The project was complicated, and it involved many delicate and sensitive issues, any of which could have derailed it if things did not go according to

plan. It was probably the most complicated humanitarian project I have been involved in—and this in a domain where every single project is complicated. Without the input and design sensitivity described above, the program could have been yet another prescriptive, "foreign," centrally mandated, and externally controlled aid program that would have been perceived as an imposed last resort that farmers had to accept in order to survive, and it might have been unsuccessful.

To summarize, project success was achieved by the following culturally grounded, research-informed, and anthropologically influenced features.

Building Confidence: Being Locally Appropriate

The project required decision-maker and gate-keeper acceptance. These were necessary to receive the support, permission, and validation of the funding agencies, national government authorities, and local authorities and leaders. Our efforts to carefully consider the socioeconomic and cultural aspects and consequences of the project design, and pilot test it, were key to gaining full support from all authorities.

Establishing Trust

In a country with extreme suspicion and distrust of foreigners (associating with Americans can be dangerous or fatal), particularly in the remote rural areas, we arranged for the project to be introduced to communities through local NGOs and then validated by the local Community Development Councils. There was no overt association with foreign agencies or governments. This was a deliberate decision that avoided the often-used emergency project approach of sending centrally based international NGOs or UN agency staff who are unknown locally. To further add local validation and prevent any stigma of foreign involvement, the inputs were transported, and the redemption process undertaken in the presence of known and trusted local government officials. All of this also further supported and reinforced efforts to strengthen a "national solidarity program" publicized by the government in combating the ongoing insurgency.

Another area of concern we identified was our original idea of using cell phone–based data entry for field staff, which we thought could greatly assist in record keeping and monitoring. This technique was coming into vogue globally at the time and was regarded as a significant advancement in saving time, effort, and cost. But we decided against implementing this because it could invoke suspicion, which could place the staff in danger, and also such technical uses would contradict what was supposed to represent a "local," home-grown project.

Sustaining and Protecting Self-Determination

We initially agreed with the donors that wheat seeds and fertilizer provided through transactions of locally redeemable vouchers was culturally appropriate because the alternative of using direct delivery of supplies would seem too similar to charity handouts. The recipients were and are a proud, independent, and self-sufficient people, unaccustomed to "relief." However, we also expanded and modified the approach: we made the vouchers open-ended and redeemable for any agricultural supplies stocked at the farm depots. In the end, almost all farmers chose seeds and fertilizer anyway, and some also got hand tools. Many, particularly women, selected gardening seeds and supplies. The farmers very much appreciated having a choice, recognizing it as an acknowledgment of their expertise and ability to devise their own solutions. The extent of ownership and self-reliance that was instilled (according to farmers' own feedback) created a sense of hope and relief about their future, and the project received considerable respect.

Transparency and Participation

There were elements of the voucher recipient selection, delivery, and redemption process that required procedures that were culturally acceptable locally and ensured effective project operations. As is always the case, there were insufficient resources to allow all households to receive vouchers. However, the communities were not entirely homogeneous economically, and some farmers had less need and were less vulnerable than others. An externally devised selection process might neglect, omit, or misunderstand local characteristics. Therefore, selection criteria were developed in consultation with local community leaders. During implementation, the criteria were applied transparently and uniformly so that no impression of favoritism or bias could emerge.

Using the locally guided recipient selection criteria, farmers had to actually apply for vouchers. Applications were reviewed and chosen by the Community Development Councils, with monitoring and oversight by project staff. To prevent misuse and corruption during redemption, recipients had to "sign" the vouchers. To accommodate the sensitive issue of illiteracy, thumbprints were used. This practice satisfied community members with the strong impression that misuse would be identified.

All these culturally appropriate activities worked to ensure that the project would be accepted and achieve its goals. The holistic and culturally relative approach of anthropology and sensitivities to local needs worked together in a very difficult geographic and geopolitical setting.

Epilogue

Note

This epilogue was written just prior to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.

The US and Afghan governments' satisfaction with the project led to a follow-on, one-year project in 2009 called AVIPA Plus, which covered the same eighteen provinces; however, its funding was increased to $360 million. Added components included temporary employment through cash-for-work community projects, grants-in-kind for local cooperatives and agribusinesses, and an increase of the copayment to 35 percent, all with a focus on rural economic and political stabilization. In the following year, AVIPA Plus was expanded yet again, to cover thirty-one (of the total thirty-four) provinces, including conflict zones. Funding then reached $431 million, while the United Kingdom and Japan undertook projects in the remaining three provinces.

Some cumulative results reported up to March 2011 include:

- the provision of 1,146,439 agricultural voucher packages worth $164 million;
- the distribution of $19 million in small grants benefitting almost 60,000 farmers;
- the provision of agricultural training for 501,000 male and female farmers (275 percent of the target);
- improvement of 338,040 hectares of arable land;
- collaborative implementation of 2,235 agricultural project activities between communities and the Afghan government;
- generation of $17 million by voucher copayments; this was used to support new agricultural support projects, which provided a 34 percent subsidy for farmers to purchase locally appropriate, low-cost, two-wheel tractors.

Finally, whether or not directly consequent of the original project, in the wake of the follow-on projects, USAID supported four 4-year regional agricultural development programs ranging in value from $28 million to $178 million.

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gency response, and humanitarian assistance as a full-time practitioner. Until recently, he worked on international programs, and he lived overseas for over twenty years. He has held senior management and executive positions at a range of international NGOs, and he has worked for USAID several times. Koons has served on the Society for Applied Anthropology's Nominations Committee and twice on their annual program committee. Starting as a charter member of WAPA, he has been president twice, chaired the program committee, served on the board of directors for many years, and has been on the Praxis Award committee twice (2017, 2021). He has often written and mentored young anthropologists on practitioner employment.

Note

1. In 2020, the British government merged DFID and another government department to form a new agency, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO).

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